The Socio-Cultural, Relational Approach to Populism by Ostiguy, Pierre
                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PACO, ISSN: 2035-6609 - Copyright © 2020 - University of Salento, SIBA: http://siba-ese.unisalento.it 
 
 
 
PArtecipazione e COnflitto 
* The Open Journal of Sociopolitical Studies 
http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/paco   
ISSN: 1972-7623 (print version) 
ISSN: 2035-6609 (electronic version) 
PACO, Issue 13(1) 2020: 29-58 
DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v13i1p29 
 
Published in March 15, 2020 
Work licensed under a Creative Commons At-
tribution-Non commercial-Share alike 3.0 
Italian License  
RESEARCH ARTICLE 
 
THE SOCIO-CULTURAL, RELATIONAL APPROACH TO POPULISM 
 
Pierre Ostiguy  
University of Valparaíso 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: The article presents the relational, socio-cultural approach to populism, also referred to by 
some as “performative”. The approach claims phenomenological validity cross-regionally and is complex 
enough to provide a theory of populism and its subjective logic, while minimal enough to be used handily 
by other scholars. Populism is not a set of decontesting ideas or “ideology”, but a way of being and acting 
in politics, embodying in discourse and praxis the culturally popular and “from here”, in an antagonistic 
and mobilizational way against its opposite, together with personalism as a concrete mode of authority. 
Defined in the most synthetic way, populism is the flaunting of what I typologically call the “low”. I also 
argue that civilizational projects of different kinds create a distasteful “unpresentable other”; populists 
then claim that this Other is nothing less than the true Self of the nation, its “authentic” people, 
disregarded in that process. Relatedly, the article introduces the general populist scheme of contending 
forces, present cross-regionally and in left as well as right populisms, with “the people” facing a three-way 
coalition: a nefarious minority Otherized; global forces strongly playing in favor of it; a government in line 
with that minority or alliance. Populism extolls the national pleb “as is” and promise to reconcile the 
nation with itself by making the plebs the whole. The cultural component of populism should be 
domesticated by political scientists, since it has deep roots in cleavage formation theory, the sociology of 
distinction, and updated Gramscian and Weberian sociopolitical analyses. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This article introduces and summarizes the relational, socio-cultural approach to 
populism. The specificically populist component of political appeals and performances 
can hardly be ideological in the conventional sense of either a set of ideas or a set of 
tightly inter-woven propositions, principles, plans for public policies and ontological 
world views. Populism, moreover, also presents itself on quite opposite extremes of 
the political spectrum, particularly in Europe, as well as in more centrist ideological po-
sitions, as historically observed in Latin America. This is because populism, in fact, op-
erates somewhere else, as a rhetoric or, more broadly, as a style or mode in politics. 
Populism is a way of stating certain things, a certain discourse (in the narrow sense of 
the term), but also and as well a praxis. That is, populism is something that is done.  
Populism, as a way or a certain style of doing politics, is done for relational purposes, 
to create a specific kind of bond between the populist leadership and the social sectors 
he or she is appealing to. But it covers a broad range between, at one extreme, “show 
business” and the theatrality of public performances to both bond (with certain peo-
ple) and antagonize (others), thus falling in the field of political communication, and, at 
the other, the expression of pain, suffering, frustrations, prejudices, social fears or hu-
miliations that often result from social cleavages, thus belonging in the last instance to 
the field of political sociology. One pole does not invalidate the other; but the first is 
usually viewed as being more superficial and malleable, while the second is often pre-
sented as “deeper” and harder to change. What is relevant here is that the specifically 
populist dimension is not a set of ideas per se, but a way of both presenting them and 
relating with a particular public. Populism is thus about form—although that form may 
actually convey much more “content” politically than a typical policy program. While 
the radical right and the radical left are indeed ideologies, populism is a mode of deliv-
ery, a “way of being” in public. In the socio-cultural approach, populism is thus under-
stood as a form (a style, a mode of relation)—thus its remarkable polyvalence on the 
ideological left-right spectrum. 
Through a successful populist leader, populism, in its fullest expression, seeks to 
embody the people, to “make it graphically flesh”. And here “the people” is not an ab-
stract citizenry or some desimbodied volonté générale, but, importantly, the people as 
“national pleb”—the two elements, combined, being key.1 In contrast to classical Marx-
 
1 The relation between “the nation”, populism, and nationalism is discussed below. Suffice it to say  that 
populism does not invoke “the pleb” in general (the way Marxism, for example, invokes “the proletariat”), 
but generally and almost always “the pleb from here”, which in practice is almost always a given “recog-
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ism, “the people” as privileged actor is/are not a “proletariat”, defined by relations of 
production and whose profile amongst nations would be very similar given similar eco-
nomic conditions, nor is it objectively “the nation” as a whole. Populism is always a 
part claiming to be the whole.2 That is, it is the national pleb claiming to be “the peo-
ple” (as a whole, or “true whole”). In populist terms, the populists represent the “au-
thentic”3 and “deserving” or “long suffering” “people of the nation”, who have been 
ignored or taken advantage of by an establishment—not necessarily “the political 
elite”. For this reason, cross-regionally, populists seek to represent the pleb qua non-
elite, and more specifically a “pleb from here”. The socio-cultural element comes in 
through the graphical display or scenic representation of this “people from here”, 
treated “painfully” on the public scene as if second class or at least not the way they 
think they “deserve” to be. The use of informal, locally-anchored, language, the exag-
geration of “typical” displays, the body language, are all key, recognizable, telling ele-
ments of populism socioculturally. And this use, often quite transgressive, is always di-
rected antagonistically at an Other, manifestedly not of the “national pleb”. 
Because of this immanence of the performative component, of the audiovisual na-
ture of relevant first-hand material, and especially furthermore because of how I define 
“the low” (see below), the personalized leadership—not the name, but the leader 
him/herself—is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of populism. Not surprisingly, 
we have Perón-ism, Chavismo, Gaitanismo; and online sites on populism always figure 
these peculiar leaders, from Trump, to Marine Le Pen, to Chavez. If populism is a way 
of being in public, or  more exactly the performance of a way of being in public, this 
cannot be done without the central actor, whose name, according to Laclau, acts as the 
essential empty signifier congealing the equivalential chain—and who also happens to 
have (quite) a voice. The symbol of the left is red, the Socialists used to display a rose, 
the Green have a color as their symbol, but there is no Peronism without the infinitely 
displayed pictures of Perón and Evita; Chavez, alive as President, was on every walls of 
Venezuela; there is no Front National without the Le Pen family; no “Party for Free-
dom” without platinum blond Geert Wilders, etc. Because I focus not only on discourse 
 
nizably national” pleb. In Argentina, as an example, Peronists  always refer to themselves as “the popular 
and national camp”.  
2 A wide range of authors have made that claim, from Laclau (2005) to several of his followers (and espe-
cially in Argentina), to non-Laclauians such as Canovan (1999) and Brubaker (2020). That is, “the people” is 
not only the subalterns, the underdogs, but, in populism, the subalterns claiming to be “the whole”, the 
nation/people as a whole, through what Laclau calls a hegemonic operation. Here, needless to say, the 
vertical axis disappears, replaced by the claim of fullness of the community. 
3 By “authentic” I do not mean “pure”, a term of Mudde´s definition of populism. “Authenticity” involves 
something recognizably “national-and-popular” or more precisely, truly “popularly from here”. 
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(and platforms) but on ways of being in public, the latter object is impossible to study 
without such personalized (and generally uncommon) leaderships.4 To be sure, the 
centrality of the leader (as a necessary, but not sufficient condition) does not mean 
that the political movement or “party” is authoritarian or even top-down. It only means 
that it is personalistic. In fact, in most Latin American populisms, party discipline and 
top-down control is very weak. 
In the socio-cultural approach, depictions are concrete, immanent, almost audio-
visual. That is, populism is not apprehended only through “reading” speeches, but by 
listening to them and by watching the utterer. At its extreme, the primary data for this 
approach should be audio-visual. In contrast to the orthodoxy of the ideational ap-
proach, we study discourse and ideation inductively, and treat it in the broader sense 
of meaning-creating praxes. Methodologically, the case studies can feed on ethnogra-
phy, field research, discourse analysis, partiticipant observations; the disciplinary tent 
is also broadened to include in addition to sociology and political science, cultural stud-
ies, critical studies and rhetoric. 
Despite this flexibility and inductiveness, the socio-cultural approach to populism 
does introduce, as meta-categories and at a more technical level, a key dimension of 
differentiation in political appeals and performances that we call the “high” and the 
“low,” explained below. The resulting high-low dimension in politics is in several in-
stances as structuring and defining politically as the conceptually orthogonal, much-
used, and relevant left-right dimension. Therefore, combined, there can be a “low left”, 
such as for example Hugo Chavez and Chavismo, as there can be a “low right”, such as 
Donald Trump and his rumbonctious supporters. The same applies in relation to “the 
high”, with more specifically a “high left”, as with Lionel Jospin, and a “high right”. In 
Italy, Beppe Grillo and Umberto Bossi (performing in a certain way that he is “from 
here”) can be understood respectively as low (arguably) “left” and low right. Left-right 
are important differences politically, but so are high-low differences. In countries like 
Argentina and perhaps increasingly in Italy, the high-low cleavage may be more deter-
minant for political alliances than the left-right one. 
 
4 To be sure, leadership is also very important in non-populist parties, as with Trudeau for the Liberals in 
Canada, Merkel for the CDU in Germany, Thatcher for the Tories in Britain, etc. But all these parties are 
much older than those leaders, will continue to exist well after them, and even during their terms such 
parties stood for relatively clear political principles, platforms and ideologies. In contrast, the PSUV (who 
even know those acronyms?) is whatever Chavez decided it was; Peronism existed quite well during a large 
portion of its existence (1955-1973; 1976-1983) without even having a political party. And the PJ has se-
quentially adopted pretty much every political ideology that exists, while who is its leader is never in 
doubt. 
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Like left and right, high and low are typological political categories. Reality, actors, 
and of course history are in contrast fluid. The same way the left may be partly hege-
monic in a polity, then give way to a rightwing reaction as part of certain socioeconom-
ic agential transformations, the high can the in same way be hegemonic in a given 
country, leading to the emergence of a low challenging it politically and even taking 
power, followed by a polarized political reality or a new hegemony now of the low. 
Bluntly said, it is not because the typology is well-defined, that reality does not evolve 
and change. High and low are typological tools for grasping a changing and evolving re-
ality. Finesse therefore lies in the historical analysis itself. The types, on the other hand, 
must be judged by their theorical (and social) meaningfulness and by their sociopoliti-
cal relevance. 
“High” and “low” as political categories, like “left” and “right”, cannot be understood 
in isolation from each other. Populism is, by definition, I argue, “on the low” (see be-
low), but it is also, more specifically, a flaunting of that low, intentionally (and one may 
add antagonistically), on the public scene. Similarly, the “self-controlled” high, in its 
adamant anti-populism, almost always expresses fear of the dérive, “the drift”, or of 
dérapage. To put it in a non-orthodox way, the populist low is always a kind of “joyful 
desecration of the high”. And it tends to be animated, furthermore, by what I have 
called elsewhere (2014: 22) a “combative pleasure principle”. 
This approach to populism therefore does not downplay the importance of affects in 
populism. It is particularly well suited to take into account the emotions of the bond 
and of the interpellation. Culturally, epic poetry as in the case of the speeches of Hugo 
Chavez, music as with the Peronist march, or folk songs as with the American populist 
tradition, have always had a central presence in populist phenomena. And this should 
not come as a surprise, as populism is both expressive (more than ideational) and rela-
tional—“constituting” or extolling in many ways a people, at least in terms of identity 
and identity creation.5  
This approach is thus relational, between an “asserting” (or “flaunting”) leadership, 
on the one hand, and on the other, popular sociocultural identities or, if not, popular 
traits and ways of doing that can then be articulated as political identities. With the 
emphasis on the informal, culturally-popular, from here, comes also an element of –
performed—closeness. The informal form stands, in many ways, as (substantive) con-
tent for both proximity and for antagonism (to what is). Second, because of the marked 
contrast with the mostly standard “high” ways of doing politics, populist appeals are 
transgressive, improper, and antagonistic, in that they are intended to “shock” or pro-
 
5 To be sure, music has been equally important for the left, especially the more radical left, as well as the 
radical right.  
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voke. Formally, our approach is an understanding of populism as transgressive infor-
mality in antagonistic relation to formalities. In many ways, this is the “low” I have writ-
ten about (2009, 2017) and the “bad manners” Moffitt has emphasized (2016). These 
are not just any bad manners, however, but “bad manners” that are culturally plebeian 
and recognizably from here. And with their performative emphasis on closeness, popu-
lists concretely perform—in an antagonistic way—a representation (“act-
ing”/”portrayal”) or re-presentation of the people from here, “as is.” Arguably, popu-
lists accomplish a double trick: by re-presenting “people” as they (think) they are, they 
constitute a certain kind of “people”.6 
Populism should thus be studied empirically by looking at the performance and prax-
is of politicians (which includes, but is not limited to, discourse), and therefore audio-
visually. In terms of performativeness, I am willing to call this approach performative 
provided that, in contrast to a certain post-structuralist take on performativity, the po-
litical link that populist performance creates be popularly understood as coming from 
an expressive self, and not just simply from a given repertoire. When this performed 
expressive self of a populist leaders “works”, it creates identification—vertically, cer-
tainly, with the leader, but also horizontally amongst compañeros.  
As the “sixth truth of Peronism” states: “For a Peronist, there is nothing better than 
another Peronist!” Solidarity betweens adepts of a populist movement is highly valued 
and, when done under that guise, much practiced. It is also worth quoting the well-
known Marcha peronista, still massively actively sang, seven decades after its composi-
tion: 
 
Let’s imitate the example 
of this Argentine “real man” 
The Peronist guys 
All united we shall triumph 
   My General, you are so dear 
Perón, Perón, great leader 
   You’re the first worker. 
 
 
6 This does not mean that they constitute a people “from scratch”, that is, from a purely discursive opera-
tion; but it also means that they are not purely “mirrors” of something objective. There is a selection of 
traits, of emphases and forgetfulness, of certain experiences and not of others, that may resonate (or not) 
with their public. More importantly yet, there is a specifically political operation that transforms a certain 
popular into a given “pueblo” akin to the populists’ advertised identity. 
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The song is certainly about a macho leader to be imitated, but it is also about the 
“Peronist guys who united shall triumph”. The General may be a great leader, but he is 
also a worker—albeit the “first worker”.  
Comradship (together with a certain form of “exclusivism”) comes first, together 
with the typical extolling of the people as they are.7 Of equal importance to the lyrics 
or “discourse” analyzed here, is the way in which the Peronist march is always sung: 
banging all together the sides of the bus while crossing the city, accompanied by huge 
drums (bombos) at rallies, while raising and moving one´s arm with a “V” sign, etc. This 
performative practice is both expressive and ritualized, both chaotic and highly pre-
dictable. But in any case, popolare, informal, and emotional it is. 
Such forms, from a post-Marxist standpoint, are (intelligent) ways to construct he-
gemony within non-dominant social sectors in society. Gramsci in particular was sensi-
tive to the role of form in the difficulties experienced by communism in Southern Italy. 
That is, hegemony always extends beyond the political or ideological realm (and pre-
supposes something anterior to it), involving social and cultural processes, as Gramsci 
recognized decades ago. 
Because populism is relational and performative, it gets “constituted politically in 
the act”, itself. In contrast to socialist or liberal beliefs that can exist within the popula-
tion without a socialist or liberal politician (since these are ideologies), there are not 
per se populist beliefs (although there can be a populist sensibility) and no populism to 
speak of without the phenomenon itself being practiced. Thus the current trend to 
study populism from a demand side of “populist beliefs” amongst the voters (Spruyt et 
al 206), separately from a supply side (of “populist speeches” by political leaders), is 
problematic. The situation is moreover made more complex, second, in that populism 
in its praxis actually redefines the borders of what is sayable and hence doable in poli-
tics. The examples are too numerous to list: one may think of Perón taking off his suit 
and speaking in short sleeves in the 1940s (something then highly inappropriate and 
which caused scandal); of Chavez singing (form) on his television show and telling G. W. 
Bush on public television that he is a donkey, a coward, and a drunkard (content); of 
Trump’s campaign launch speech accusing Mexican illegal immigrants of being drug 
traffickers and rapists;8 of Beppe Grillo’s Vaffanculo; etc. In that sense, populism  often 
 
7 Note that in contrast to revolutionary socialism, the goal is not to create a “new man” or transform the 
self; the people, as they concretely are, are simply the best! And the people, here, are certainly not de-
scribed as “pure”, but simply as “great”.  
8 The accusation to Mexicans immigrants is of course nativist and not populist. But the provocative, trans-
gressive public style and sheer excess of tracing with pathos murders in the US to such an unlikely cause is, 
in form, populist. 
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domestically launches a socio-cultural revolution about public political manners, about 
what is sayable in public, about what a statesman is and should be, etc. It is further-
more incorrect to reduce such excentric, provocative, “innovative”, and shocking-to-
many behaviour to “national traditions”, as certainly nothing of the style of Chavez had 
ever existed in Venezuela before him, or of Perón’s in Argentina before him, or (at least 
in the 20th century) like Trump in the U.S. For better or worst, successful populists of-
ten create a before and an after, in the way politics is done. So in that sense, “doing 
populism”, with that stylistic rupture—something that always triggers sharp resistance 
and reactions—creates “populism”. It is thus misleading to simply measure “populist 
political opinions” (as if such things existed, as the core of populism is not at the level 
of opinion) and match it with political supply. This methodology does not grasp the 
performative nature and societal effects of populist performance. Certainly, some ter-
rains are more fertile for populism than others, but the so-called supply and so-called 
demand do not exist separately from one another. 
Ideologies, even if “thin”, require a certain level of complexity if they are going to 
both decontest (Freeden, 2003) and provide meaningful answers.9 But populism is a re-
lational phenomenon, defined by the connection established between the leader and 
supporters, a relation that displays both a socio-cultural and a politico-cultural compo-
nent (see below). It is relational furthermore in terms of the people-leader’s hostile re-
lation to a “nefarious” Other. It ends up thus being about identity creation and identi-
ties, more than about “world views” or “ideologies. 
At the other extreme, populism should not be reduced to simple manipulation or 
“sheer demagogy” to achieve numbers, as often happens in the so-called strategic ap-
proach (e.g. Weyland 2001), where ideas as such appear irrelevant and the leader is 
everything. I much recognize the centrality of leadership features, but do not treat 
populism as a merely top-down phenomenon, but rather, as a two-way phenomenon 
and process. Oddly enough, the ontologically entirely different, constructivist discur-
sivist approach is often guilty of the same thing, assigning an all-powerful role to dis-
cursive interpellations on “blank” subjects. In “demagogy” there is something decep-
tively simple in that the success of the appeals is never fully explained, except either by 
the followers´ lack of sophistication and/or the leader´s lack of scruples. There is thus a 
very fine line theoretically between an all-powerful strategic leader who manipulates 
 
9 It is difficult to phantom how the three lines of Mudde’s definition can thus be an “ideology”. The thin 
ideologies of feminism or of ecology are infinitely more complex than that. While analyses of populism 
abound, populist texts (in the political or social movement arena) are also rare, in contrast, say, to quality 
feminist texts or ecological publications. 
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the unarticulated (or “blank”) mass, and an articulated popular demand that is simply 
“in wait” of its supply. 
Finally, I attempt to provide here a normatively neutral definition of populism (and 
an explanation of its supporters’ logic), relying on the normatively complex concept of 
the “low” in politics. In the “flaunting of ‘the low,’” there is certainly a subjective, iden-
tity-affirming notion of “antagonism,” central in many definitions of populism (includ-
ing that of Laclau 2005). In Europe, populism has generally had a highly negative nor-
mative connotation. It has also, or moreover, been associated with the right. In the 
Americas—both the US and Latin America—populism has generally carried a positive 
normative connotation, particularly for left-of-center analysts and scholarly sympathiz-
ers of the popular sectors (e.g., O’Donnell 1973; Collier and Collier 1991). In the Ameri-
cas, populism is a concept associated with socially-democratizing, incorporating, plebe-
ian and anti-elitist defining features. The more recent Laclauian radical-left understand-
ing of populism, linked politically (and historically) to Kirchnerism, Evo Morales’ gov-
ernment and Chavismo, has crossed the Atlantic to Europe with Podemos´ professors, 
Melanchon´s France Insoumise and the akin Syriza government. Overall, populism is 
somehow normatively understood as simultaneously characterized by an authoritarian 
and intolerant drift and emancipatory potential (Mouffe 2018).  My approach is not in-
different to these key debates, on the contrary; but as a starter, it certainly does not 
posit that populism is to be expected more on the left or on the right, nor that it has 
per se either an exclusionary or an incorporating and emancipatory social effect.  
The following section introduces this (antagonistic) sociocultural-“performative” ap-
proach and its logic through an “affectual narrative” (Weber, 1978: 25). Despite the 
very local nature and texture of all populisms, they are cross-regionally characterized 
by a surprisingly similar affectual narrative. The subsequent section—core of the arti-
cle—introduces and presents the notions of the “high” and the “low,” in politics.  
 
 
2. The Affectual Narrative and the Populist Schemata 
 
There is something odd about populism: populists claim to represent the authentic 
people and/or nation, are allergic to foreignizing trends, and affirm to be particularly 
anchored in their own particular nation. Yet, they tend to trigger the almost unanimous 
condemnation of the diverse authorized voices of the very nation to which they are so 
attached. The situation is thus in sharp contrast, say, to Marxists who are attacked and 
rejected by capital (and its organic intellectuals), and who very much agree with that 
particular excommunication. Populists in contrast not only disagree with such a disa-
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vowal, but turn it around as an indication that they, not those disavowing them, truly 
represent the nation and its people. While there may be irreconcilable antagonism be-
tween populists and the anti-populists, both claim to represent what “the people of 
this nation truly stands for”. Second, despite these grand claims, the ideological elabo-
ration of the populist claims tend to be limited—while awakening strong contrarian 
passions. 
How is one to solve these related puzzles? I wish here to start at the most generic 
and somewhat abstract level, with what I have called “civilizational projects” and their 
empirical, concrete relation to the popular sectors. Even one of the most radical of 
such projects, the republican project of Third Republic France, inspired by the dis-
course of the French Revolution, has often in practice been a project of instituteurs, of 
school masters “educating the peasants”. Clearly more classist have been the oligar-
chical liberal projects of South America in the late 19th century, whether in Chile, Ar-
gentina or Brazil. Such projects, despite their sinuous historical progression, have had 
“right”, but also often “might”, on their side –as in the full capture of the state appa-
ratus. The more “right” and “moral appropriateness” have been stringently empha-
sized (always with the help of might), the more a sort of “unpresentable Other” as a 
result has emerged or been created. The democratic and racially-blind project of US 
liberalism had its unpresentables in the redneck Confederate Southerners. The open-
minded, inclusive republican project in France has its unpresentable Other in the not 
soft-spoken “racist” or xenophobic laissés pour compte.10 The proper, “Europeanized”, 
socially-mobile Argentine of the Alberdi/ Sarmiento civilizational project had its unpre-
sentable Other in the alledgedly more “brutish”, less educated, darker skinned, and so-
cially not mobile “cabecita negra” (“little black head”) or even in the 1940s union-
affiliated worker who did not mind breaking with left parties (of cadres) in order to 
support a Coronel with “fascist” sympathies (but who improved conditions of living). 
The Erdogan project has been the underside of the historical Kemalist project in Tur-
key. A similar list11, for any country that has experienced populism, can arguably be 
drawn up.  
Such “civilizational projects” possess remarkably varied content. They are as varie-
gated, depending on the society, as liberalism, multi-culturalism, adapting to the ways 
and manners of the First World or the West, orthodox “textbook” economics, Europe-
an integration, racial integration, colonial France’s “mission civilisatrice”, etc. And reac-
 
10 There is no reason for an ENAP graduate, in France, to be xenophobic. 
11 Had there been mass politics in 19th century Italy, populist movements based on local dialects would 
certainly have taken place in reaction to the erudite project of Italian unification. Perhaps brigantaggio 
could also be read through these lens.  
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tively, the content of populism will therefore not be the same in France, the US South, 
Venezuela, Southeastern Europe, or the Philippines. The key point here, however, is 
that such civilizational projects will invariably create what I call an “Unpresentable 
Other”. And this Unpresentable Other usually provokes shame or embarrassment on 
the part of “decent” (gente decente), “politically correct” (in the US), “proper” or “well-
educated” people. 
In that light, populism, independently of continents, can analytically be understood 
as an antagonistic appropriation, for political, mobilizational purposes, of an “unpre-
sentable Other”—itself historically created in the process of a specific “proper” civiliza-
tional project. The political entrepreneurs flaunting this Other, in turn, claim to be 
speaking in the name of a “repressed truth” (especially in Europe) or of “previously ex-
cluded social sectors” (more often in Latin America) or the “silent majority” (in the US). 
The populist casts that so-called “unpresentable Other” to which he is appealing as 
both damaged and “swept under the rug” by official discourse and policies. Populists 
present themselves as fetching such people from “under the rug” and bringing them to 
the political fore in a loud, perhaps ugly (or at best, oddly “exotic”) but definitely 
“proud” way. In that sense, populism is clearly performative. 
The last step in this affectual and sociocultural narrative is what I call the final inver-
sion: the so-called Unpresentable Other is presented to be not some Other, but in fact 
the “truest” (“too long forgotten”) Self of the nation, of “the people.” That is, the Na-
tion and its people is not what “they” tried to transform it into, but “the remainder” 
(and in many way more “originary”)12: us. If they take power and achieve political dom-
inance, populists cast the previous “civilizers” as a minority who never understood the 
sensibility and interests of the “vast majority of our people”, presented as sociocultur-
ally distinct. In that case, the ex “civilizers” have lost the battle for hegemony. Thus the 
inversion: the old Representatives were not representative; and the Other is no Other, 
but our truest Self.     
The populist leader generally claims—politically incorrectly and often vulgarly and 
with “bad manners”—to be  the “fighting hero” of that (truly) authentic, laissé pour 
compte, people. Because of what has been stated, populism is thus almost always 
transgressive: of the “proper” way of doing politics, of proper public behavior, or of 
what can or “should” be publicly said. This transgression (“in bad taste”), as with the 
biting insults of Hugo Chávez, the utterly incorrect Bossi or Berlusconi, the extrava-
gance of Huey Long, can be appreciatively received in certain sectors. Some of these 
 
12 It is not surprising in that light that most populisms acquire a nativist form, independently of questions 
of immigration, so-called cultural “anxieties”, etc. That nativism, however, is not originary but reactive, 
linked constitutively to the “civilizing” project. 
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transgressions, when by a male politician, figure as “manly,” with quite “home grown” 
elements. Since populism claims to speak on behalf of a “truth” or a “reality” that is 
not accepted in the more official, larger circles of the world, and of private praxes that 
are not deemed proper in official politics but that are quite “typical of the reality from 
here”, if there is thus not some kind of “scandal,” whether in terms of policy practices, 
public behavior, positions championed, or mode of addressing adversaries, then one is 
not really looking at a case of populism. When it has the wind in its sails, populism is 
the celebratory desecration of the “high.” 
Finally, and simply, there is a kind of populist schemata of the forces en présence, 
that seems to be universally present across world regions and countries, as well as 
across the political spectrum, left to right (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 – Populist Scheme (cross-regionally) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Elaboration 
The main actor (perceived by populists as already existing, but in fact politically to be 
constituted) is of course “the people”, el pueblo, il popolo, le peuple. By definition, this 
is the majority of the people of this society. The diagnosis is there are a large number 
of individuals/people from “the people”, usually the most “typically from here,” whose 
voice is not being heard, and whose interests are not being safeguarded. They are also 
not given the “due recognition” they “deserve”, whether as downtrodden indigenous 
in Bolivia, long-time Frenchmen in France, or hard-working (white) Americans in the 
US.  
“The people” faces unfortunately a three-way coalition: a key, nefarious, and re-
sented minority –the Social Other—at odds with “the people”; hostile (and very power-
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ful) global/international forces, playing in favor of the former; and a government or po-
litical elite incomprehensibly in line with that minority or with that “alliance”. The ne-
farious minority, first—of the three, generally the object of greatest hatred—is not 
necessarily the social elite, and even less so the famed political elite of Mudde and oth-
ers. That nefarious minority can be the oligarchy, the illegal Mexican immigrants, the 
financial sector, an ethnic but powerful minority, the liberal elites of the Coasts, the 
Jews, the “White Turks”, white colonizers or black minorities, depending on the casting 
of the social antagonism (see also Brubaker 2020).13 Usually, that “nefarious minority” 
has a direct or indirect link with the civilizational project referred to above: whether it 
is multi-culturalism, liberalism, the mission civilizatrice, or else.  
Synchronically, in the populist script there is always, second, a set of global or inter-
national forces (allied with the nefarious minority within the country), whose role for 
the people is clearly negative. This can be imperialism and its alliance with the local oli-
garchy; it can be globalism in its alliance with financial capital and immigration and ref-
ugees (as stated by Marine Le Pen in her double prong); it can be “countries taking ad-
vantage of us”, as Trump states; Soviet infiltration for McCarthy; European colonialism; 
and now perhaps the technocrats of the EU in Bruxels; etc.  
In populist diagnoses, the problem could have remained strictly one of social antag-
onism if “our” government and most of the political elite (even crossing the left-right 
divide), third, had not taken the “wrong” side. To reverse this disgraceful situation, pol-
itics and the control of the state thus become indispensable tools. The focus of popu-
lism´s analysts on the political elite, however, is partly misguided: sometimes the “po-
litical class” is, indeed, the nefarious minority in question and is understood in terms its 
unwarranted social priviledge; but most of the times the political elite is mainly “guilty” 
of not taking the side of “the people”. 
Provocatively “speaking the truth” in public, agitation, and mobilizing are the only 
populist remedies. Agitation, indignation, provocations become ontologically indispen-
sable in populism, since willful political action is absolutely “all there is.”14 Once in 
power, it is striking in contrast how the language of “love” towards their own followers 
 
13 Not for this do I distance myself from the vertical axis that is key in populism (in contrast to nationalism), 
as De Cleen and Stavrakakis have forcefully written. Even when the nefarious minority is objectively situat-
ed “below” or at “the margins”, as stated by Brubaker, there remains for those sympathetic to populism a 
certain sense of unacceptable “victimhood”, of being “left behind”, of not being given the recognition 
they/we rightfully deserve because of the alliance of the political elite with the minority and allied global 
forces at “our” expense. 
14 This is probably why post-fundational Laclau equates populism with politics. Lenin, independently of his 
professed Marxism, may have been in What is to be done? the first “populist” theoretician (something 
Laclau seems to have grasped). 
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becomes central and omnipresent.15  
In the following section, we turn to the more technical and central notions of “the 
high” and “the low” in politics, at the core of the approach I present. 
 
3. The High and the Low in Politics 
 
The high-low axis in politics has to do with ways of being and acting in politics. The 
“high-low” axis is, in that sense, “cultural” and very concrete—perhaps more concrete 
actually than left and right. High and low have to do with ways of relating to people; as 
such, they go beyond “discourses” as words. They include levels of language, accent, 
body language, public gestures, and ways of dressing. As a way of relating to people, 
they also encompass the way of making decisions, in politics. These different traits may 
arguably be more difficult to credibly change than left-right positioning. High and low 
are in many ways about private expressions in the public sphere, or the publicization of 
the private man. This is why, particularly in the case of low ways and manners ex-
pressed in an impudent or imprudent way in a public sphere hegemonized by the high, 
the low is often about transgression. But at the very same time, the high and the low 
involves “public performance”. Whether it is credible “show business” or the tailored 
expression of the “true self” is mostly irrelevant.16 What matters is that in relation to 
already existing social-cultural identities, high and low ways of being allow the voter to 
recognize a politician as credibly “one of ours.” High and low are thus not superficially 
or faddishly about style, but connect deeply with a society’s history, existing group dif-
ferences, identities, and resentments. In some instances, as in Argentina or Turkey, 
they even “stylishly” express deep-seated cleavages. 
Conceptually and at the theoretical level, the high-low axis consists of two related 
sub-dimensions or components: the social-cultural and the political-cultural. The latter 
is “cultural” in the same sense that one can speak of certain political sub-cultures. The 
former is cultural in a more sociological way, in the sense which sociologist Bourdieu 
(1979) writes about cultural capital, when it comes to “distinction.” Both are empirical-
ly as well as theoretically correlated. Their angle one to the other—borrowing from the 
idiom of statistics—is sharper than that between the main two well-established dimen-
sions of the left-right axis (the “valoric” and the “socioeconomic” issues). The high-low 
 
15 In Latin America, this is remarkable in the discourse of Evita, of Chávez, and in campains ads of Cristina 
Kirchner. 
16 And with exceptions, the two may not be as far apart as one would theoretically say. It is doubtful, for 
example, if Donald Trump in private is less (or more) of a bully than he is in his public performance.  
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axis thus appears more unequivocally unidimensional (in a Downsian way), than the 
left-right dimension. 
A last preliminary clarification, regarding terminology: since our approach is basically 
relational, we prefer to talk about appeals, in politics. It should be stated, first, that ap-
peals have a substantial emotional side, in that they trigger affects and at times identi-
fication. Second and in contrast with a pure post-fundationalist ontology, identities 
cannot be entirely reduced causally to circulating discourses. There is in my view a sub-
jectivity, however dislocated, that must be interpreted. More precisely, there is not a 
radical original absence, but sets of experiences, involving very real sensations (pain, 
hunger, feelings of contempt, vulnerability, etc.), which must be interpreteted and for 
which certain interpellations are more apt to resonate than others. There is something 
sociologically and historically “already there” that insures that all discourses and inter-
pellations cannot be blindly interchangeable. The struggle for hegemony moreover in-
volves already-constituted subjects, capable of being drawn to different interpellations 
which resonate more (or less) with their experience. I thus ontologically posit a subject 
with a “space” between sociological and discursive determinations. A complex process 
occurs between the felt experience of the person and interpellations that name it, at 
the level of identity creation. Successful populisms are particularly effective at present-
ing interpellations in which the (sedimented) “identity of the popular” achieves some 
recognition. My ontology therefore includes actors, not only discourses. 
Turning from post-structuralists to rationalist scholars who may equate appeals (as 
discussed above) with demagogy, appeals in politics equally apply to the left-right di-
mension. From a rationalist standpoint, an appeal in politics is simply a way in which a 
politician or a party attempts, usually consciously, to woo supporters. Programmatic 
appeals or platforms are thus also appeals in that same generic sense. In contrast to a 
Downsian perspective assuming already-fixed and already-constituted voter prefer-
ences, appeals may reflect, but can also bring to life, preferences and liking/dislikes. 
Furthermore, new appeals and “images” can unsettle and modify already-constituted 
identities: for example, a person may have considered herself a leftist, but when faced 
with the style and performance of Hugo Chavez, react by going to the anti-populist 
camp.  
If populism is the (antagonistic, mobilizing) flaunting of the “low,” we had now bet-
ter define what is the “low,” in politics (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 – Constitutive Dimensions of High-Low Appeals in Politics 
Source: Author’s Elaboration 
Pierre Ostiguy, The socio-cultural, relational approach to populism 
 
45 
 
The Socio-Cultural Component 
The first and perhaps main component of the high-low axis is the social-cultural ap-
peal (or performance) in politics. This component encompasses manners, demeanors, 
ways of speaking and dressing, vocabulary, and tastes displayed in public. On the high, 
people publicly present themselves as well-behaved, proper, composed, and perhaps 
even bookish. Politicians on the high are often “well-mannered”, “self-restrained”, 
perhaps even polished, in public self-presentation. Negatively, they can appear as stiff, 
rigid, serious, colorless, somewhat distant, or even boring. The “technocratic look” 
such as that produced by the French grandes écoles is clearly on the high. On the low, 
people frequently use slang or folksy expressions and metaphors, are more demonstra-
tive in their bodily or facial expressions as well as in their demeanor, and display more 
raw, culturally popular tastes.17 Politicians on the low are capable of being more unin-
hibited in public and are also more apt to use coarse or popular language. To the ob-
servers on the high, they often appear as more “colorful” and in more extreme cases, 
somewhat grotesque. 
It cannot be stressed enough that the “low” in politics is not synonymous with poor 
people or lower social strata. In the US, Donald Trump was immensely richer than 
Barack Obama, but Obama was clearly much more “high.” The same applied in Italy be-
tween Monti (and even more so, Veltroni), on the high, and Berlusconi, on the million-
aire low. Even in the electorate, levels of wealth and high-low positioning can in no way 
be equated.  
This social-cultural component is, in fact, a politicization of the social markers em-
phasized in the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu in his classic social theory work on taste 
and aesthetics (1979). From a different theoretical, although equally sociological per-
spective, it is a politicization of the—empirically quite similar—differences in concrete 
manners, at the core of Norbert Elias’s work (1982). Bourdieu sees cultural capital as a 
“legitimate” form of distinction or credential, and a marker of respectability. Elias’s his-
torical sociology was concerned about a long-term process of “civilization” in manners. 
Nonetheless, for both sociologists, one pole of the spectrum is a kind of propriety (and 
even distinction or refinement) that is legitimate by prevailing international standards. 
18  
Although sociocultural differences or contrasts are present in all societies, and are 
even at times very sharp and recognized as quite meaningful, these differences are 
 
17 Heavy local accents and expressive body language are all, in a certain way, difficult-to-ignore intrusions 
of physicality, of the concrete particular body and locality, in social interaction. 
18 It is indifferent that Bourdieu views the function of the habitus of distinction negatively, while Elias 
much approved of the “civilizing process”: of interest here is the spectrum ordering such practices. 
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usually not constitutive of given political identities and often remain largely outside the 
political arena. For instance, while heavy drinking and loud singing at the pub is part of 
a stereotyped British working-class identity, it is not specifically associated with the La-
bour Party or its leaders. But in some cases, sociocultural differences or contrasts do 
become politicized. That is, manners, publicized tastes, language, and modes of public 
behavior do become associated with, and even defining of, political identities. In such 
cases, social identities with their many cultural attributes interact with political identi-
ties. While to be sure everything in the social world is in the last instance constructed, 
those social identities are much more sedimentated than more obviously constructed 
political identies. We cannot therefore put at the same level of “constructedness” the 
popular and the pueblo: traits of the popular can be sociologically observed, while “the 
people” is more obviously a political discursive operation (which, however, cannot re-
fer to just anything). 
Appeals on the high-low dimension are not only differences in style, although they 
certainly are that. They are public manifestations of recognizably social aspects of the 
self (and desires) in society , manifestations that contribute to creating a social sense of 
trust based on assumed sameness or coded understanding. And quantitatively, politi-
cians as well as parties (that share certain practices) can be ranked ordinally on the 
high-low axis, within a society.   
Within the social-cultural dimension, one must also clearly include the more “native” 
or “from here” versus cosmopolitanism, as shown in Figure 2 and, especially, 3. Cer-
tainly, on the more “raw,” culturally-popular pole, the specific expressions, practices, 
and repertoires characterizing the sociocultural component can only be taken from a 
very particular, culturally bounded and locally developed, repertoire (even though the 
general themes may be quite common). On the other hand, the appearance, deport-
ment, and mode of discourse of political elites generally share commonalities. We thus 
bring in a second element within the social-cultural dimension of Figure 2 and now 
shown in detail in Figure 3: the axis or scale between cosmopolitanism and the “from 
here”. This element figures prominently in populist movements, cross-regionally. Iden-
tification with “the heartland,” as stated by Taggart (2000) and in contrast to more im-
personal international cultural ways, is indeed a recurrent element of populism. 
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Figure 3 – Characteristics and Components of the High and Low in Politics 
 
Source: Author’s Elaboration 
As Canovan (1999: 3–5) amongst others has highlighted, “the people” as a collective 
has more than one meaning: it can refer to the popular sectors, the plebs, the political-
ly subaltern, or it can be the people of a specific national community, like “the people 
of England” –at times with tropes of the heartland. The llaneros in Venezuela, the 
hardworking farmers and ranchers of the US heartland, that is, the “typical” and cul-
turally-recognizable working people from here are always at the core of the “true peo-
ple” imaginary of the populists. Both aspects belong to the sociocultural dimension. 
Considering the—political and conceptual— debates raging in Europe on the relation 
between populism and nationalism, summarily clarifying one’s analytic position is in-
dispensable. Indeed, the “from here” could be equated with nativism, which in turn 
can become equated with right-wing nationalism, in turn becoming synonymous with 
the common usage of populism in Europe. However, the constitutive component of the 
“from here” in no way entails xenophobic rightwing nativism as, contingently, articu-
lated in Europe. In Argentina for example, nationalist Peronist populism, strongly em-
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phasizing a certain “from here”, discursively embraces lower-class Bolivian and Para-
guayan immigration, as such immigrants are also considered “from here” (Latin Ameri-
can brothers, like us), in contrast to a Muslim or Canadian immigrant. Second, in Latin 
America, the emphasis on the “from here” has been archetypical of leftwing populism 
and nationalism, in opposition to “foreignizing”, right-wing, “neoliberal” elites, Bolivia 
being the most extreme example. One must therefore distinguish what is contigently 
articulated in Europe from the more generic conceptual understanding of populism.  
This being said, there is no doubt that populism goes with “the people from here”, 
not just with the underdogs in general—and not just because most political struggles 
occur within countries, rather than transnationally. The famed expression “national 
and popular” is thus not merely coincidental. While the concepts nationalism and pop-
ulism indeed should not be conflated (see De Cleen and Stravakakis 2017), Brubaker 
(2020) is correct that:  
 
appeals to ‘the people´ are at once vertical (against those on top) and horizontal 
(against outside forces or groups) and, further, …vertical and horizontal appeals are 
constituvively interwined, such that ´the elite´is represented a both on top and outside 
(2020:46). 
 
Ostiguy and Casullo (2017)’s images of “punching upward and outward”, or “down-
ward and outward”, capture the same idea. In other words, the horizontal and vertical 
are not just contingently articulated, but rather constitutively compounded. “The peo-
ple” is thus also a large group different from other peoples and implying some sense of 
solidarity. As such, as Laclau would also have it with hegemony, “the people” are both 
the pleb and the bounded, distinct community.19 Inequality and difference are indeed 
both constitutive components of “the/a people”. Populism is the hyping up of both 
components (the “culturally popular” “from here”), against the self-assured “civilizers” 
and cosmopolitans on the high. Nationalism, in contrast, does not involve this internal 
fracture or “the double reference to part and whole” (Brubaker 2020:50).20   
What all poles of our low dimension (Figure 3) share in common is greater emphasis 
on immediacy (both in discourse and practices), in a more concrete, earthy, and cultur-
 
19 In psychoanalytic terms, nationalism provokes jouissance by promising national greatness; populism 
provokes jouissance by promising the reconciliation of the nation with itself (by making the plebs the 
whole, “the reconciled community”) and by extolling the non-elite.   
20 My only difference with Brubaker is that “the people” polysemically boils down to two acceptations, not 
three. The people are: the non-elite and the demos of a bounded community. This distinct, bounded 
community is obviously made up of individuals or people who, in turn (in democratic times) may want to 
act as citizens (or demos) and be collectively sovereign. 
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ally localist (“from here”) way, while the reverse is true of abstracting mediation. The 
high, in contrast, tends to justify its concerns in more abstract terms and to convey 
them through more “universalizing,” less culturally localized language. Since the em-
phasis here really concerns localist traits and cultural practices (more than the nation 
per se, as in nationalism), one could in fact well imagine a regionalist populism (e.g., in 
Texas or in Italy´s constitutive regions).  
 
The Political-Cultural Component 
The second component of the high-low dimension in politics is political-cultural. This 
component is about forms or style of political leadership and preferred (or advocated) 
modes of decision-making in the polity. Leadership mode is indeed one of our defining 
criteria for populism (and non-populism). On the high, there is a claim to favor formal, 
impersonal, legalistic, institutionally-mediated models of authority. On the low, politi-
cal appeals emphasize very personalistic, strong (often male) leadership.21 Personalistic 
(and, at the Weberian extreme, charismatic) versus procedural authority (akin to We-
ber´s legal-rationalism) is a good synthesis of this polarity. The high generally claims to 
represent procedural “normalcy” (at least as a goal to be achieved) in the conduct of 
public life, along with formal and generalizable procedures in public administration. 
The personalist pole generally claims to be much closer to “the people”, to “love 
them”, and to represent them better than those advocating a more impersonal, proce-
dural, proper model of authority.  
Political science has devoted much attention to this “procedural”, institutionalist 
component, almost always normatively favoring the high pole. This attention is not 
surprising, considering Dahl´s well-known two orthogonal features of (popular) partici-
pation and willful acceptance of opposition—the forte of populism and of liberal de-
mocracy, respectively. There indeed is a strong mobilizational component in the prac-
tices of populism (at least in Latin America). Respect for rules, division of powers, and 
the autonomy of state bodies are meanwhile central in liberal democracy. In most in-
stances of populism in power, cross-regionally, those institutional limitations are ex-
plicitly perceived by populist leaders as undesirably limiting popular sovereignty and 
the people’s will. 
Liberals are quick normatively and politically to label populist leaders “authoritari-
ans”. The label is misleading; “plebescitarian” is much more accurate in the case of the 
 
21 The characterization of “strong” is not to be equated with “authoritarian,” even if politicians on the high 
often attempt to make that equation for politically motivated purposes. There is also a strong, affection-
ate, “caring”, female gendered version of that personalistic form of leadership, which can certainly be 
quite combative, from Evita Peron to Sarah Palin’s “grizzly moms.”   
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populist logic (Barr 2009: 35-36; 38-39). But for liberalism, there is a small step be-
tween majoritarianism and authoritarianism. The same accusation was leveled by lib-
erals against socialism a century ago (e.g. Berlin 1958). The liberal institutional archi-
tecture often figures as (and often is) an obstacle to popular will and to the redemptive 
expectations associated with the transformative populist projects. But hostility or indif-
ference to a liberal institutional architecture is not unique to populism. What in that 
regard is unique to populism is “an appeal . . . proclaiming the vox populi . . . [through] 
vivid [leaders] who can make politics personal and immediate, instead of being remote 
and bureaucratic” (Canovan, 1999: 14). In its strongest expression, Hugo Chávez 
claimed: “I am not myself anymore, I am not an individual: I am a people!”  
Turning from political theory to discourse, a central element on the populist low is, 
as often stated in Latin America, the valuation of (strong, personalistic) leaders “with 
balls.” “Balls” are, indeed, a nodal point in populism! However, while the language of 
populism is at times steeped in a certain form of popular masculinity, “ballsyness” is 
clearly not restricted to men, including in Latin America,22 but corresponds to daring 
“people’s fighting heroes.” In brief, on the political-cultural dimension, the low entails 
a preference for decisive action often at the expense of some “formalities”; while the 
high values the “niceties” that accompany the rule of law.  
Populist personalized leadership, as a form of rapport, of performed representation, 
and of problem solving, is a way to shorten the distance between the legitimate author-
ity and the people. The polar conceptual opposite of personalized populist linkage is 
Weberian bureaucracy: impersonal, “fair” in the sense of universal and “the same for 
everyone,” procedural, and overall cold, distant, and not especially friendly.” Thus re-
garding personalistic authority, while liberals generally fear an authoritarian slippery 
slope, they miss the performed shortening of distance (and especially with the popular 
sectors) that is a key element of populist leadership. 
Consequently, the most extreme form of populist representation (performed, but al-
so experienced) and linkage is fusion, i.e., a “fusion” between the leader and the mass-
es. While it sounds ominously fascist, it is also characteristic of some rock concerts. The 
positive, understudied, flip side of the populist fusional discourse, when in power, is 
that it often explicitly is a discourse of love. But since fascism claims the same fusion, 
with its “Fuhrer principle” and mass rallies, it certainly briefly bears the question of the 
relationship of populism to fascism. Differences are important and highly significative. 
 
22 Evita Perón, for example, had “much more balls” than most populist male leaders. At the same time, 
highly personalistic female leaderships have, alternatively, empirically achieved a semi-direct relationship 
with the people, through very intense public display of affection, love, and nurturing—traditionally quite 
gendered. If the high tends to be “gender neutral,” the low generally accentuates gendered traits. 
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First, populism always empirically base its legitimacy through the frequent counting of 
votes—thus “proving” that the populist leader is “what the people want.” Fascism (a 
regime type) ends elections once it wins them; populism appears to multiply them and 
often supplements them with referendums.23 Second, fascism governs in a disciplined 
manner, from the state down. Populism is much more ambivalent: though it often uses 
the state apparatus with little délicatesse, it also fosters a myriad of not overly coordi-
nated movements, organizations, circles, with a grassroots component. Third, fascism 
is more prone to extol the nation (or even “the race”) and its leader, while populism 
extols the people (of that nation) and its leader. 
In brief, the politico-cultural component of the low, personalization, is about lack of 
formal institutionalization, a trait central to many political scientists’ definitions of 
populism (e.g. Weyland, 2001), at the same time very much a style of mass politics 
(Knight, 1998; Moffitt 2016). 
 
Underlying Commonality and Definition  
What do these three components of the high-low axis—that is, the coarser cultural-
ly- popular, the “from here”, and personalization—have in common? It is, quite simply, 
the level of sublimation and of suppression judged ideal in the exercise of leadership 
and authority, as well as public behavior.  
On identification and desires in politics, a notable trait of politics on the “low” is its 
more performative, frequent “soap-opera” aspect. Laclau goes too far in casting the 
leader as an empty signifier, condensing our desire for plenitude. His or her significa-
tion is not “empty”, while is at times wildly polysemic. For example, the concrete Car-
los Menem publicly fulfilled—crassly, but with gusto—many (traditional popular-sector 
masculine) manly myths. That is, as  Laclau also noticed (2005: 58-59), the leader is 
both like me (a “me” with no cultural titles) and an ego ideal—but one that is accessi-
ble and understandable. In populism, those fantasies are coarser and display an antag-
onistic dimension—a flaunting. Populism is thus a kind of personal (on the part of the 
leader) and collective (on the part of the movement) narcissistic affirmation, with “the 
middle finger” defiantly raised to the well-brought-up, the proper, the accepted truths 
and ways associated with diverse world elites. It is a flaunting of “our” low, in politics. 
In summary and overall, populism, defined, is the antagonistic, mobilizational flaunt-
ing in politics of the culturally popular24 and ”from here”, and of personalism as a mode 
 
23 For example, in Venezuela during the fourteen years of Chavez’s rule, there were ten major national 
elections or referendums, where the official side could have lost (and did loose in one instance). 
24 “Popular” not as “widespread in the population,” but culturally popular, populaire, popolare, of “the 
popular sectors,” of “regular folks.” 
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of decision-making. The culturally popular and the native act as emblematic of what 
has been “disregarded”25 in the polity, while personalism is both a mode of identifica-
tion and of fixing this “disregard”. Defined in the most synthetic way, populism is the 
antagonistic, mobilizational flaunting of the “low.” 
 
 
4. Populism and A Two-Dimensional Political Space  
 
Both the left-right and high-low axes are actually, theoretically and empirically, or-
thogonal to one another (Ostiguy 2009, 2017).26 Together, they form—when both pre-
sent in politics—a two-dimensional political space of appeals, in which we can locate 
actors, parties, and politicians (ibid). This basic political space is illustrated in Figure 4. 
Such Cartesian location, furthermore, has significant consequences in the sociological-
ly-differentiated reception of political appeals and in the social composition of the vote 
(Ostiguy 1998).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 The accurate term is, in French, laissé pour compte, translating roughly as overlooked, eglected, not tak-
en into account, ignored, left by the wayside. 
26 One advantage of the political space delineated in Figure 4 is that any combination is not only possible, 
as is also the case in spaces configured by non-orthogonal axes, but (in contrast to Kitschelt´s spaces) 
equally possible, in any given one society.   
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Figure 4 – A Two-Dimensional Political Space 
 
 
Source: Author’s Elaboration 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This article did not attempt to answer the important question of “what triggers, and 
when” populism. In the literature hypotheses have come and went. The objective was 
more narrow, but not for this more modest. The goal was to provide an understanding 
of populism that is thick enough to make sense of it in and of itself. This understanding 
goes (much) beyond the three lines of “the pure people versus the corrupt elite, and 
the Rousseauian expression of the general will,” which is not really a theory of popu-
lism, nor quite makes it as the definition of an ideology, however thin. Why this thin 
conceptualization has spread like wildfire in Europe remains to me somewhat mysteri-
ous. Methodologically, furthermore, any ideational analysis must be inductive and 
strive to constantly refresh itself, in that regard—to avoid top-down coding as self-
referential. 
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In my view, there can be no populism without presence of the popolare.27 There are 
many ways, and several facets of the popolare, for turning “the” popolare into a popolo 
as a useful category in actual politics, and to give it a particular meaning through—non-
neutral ideologically—political discourses. Since “the people” does have a pleb compo-
nent, it cannot be sociologically entirely neutral, or even less so, be made up mostly of 
the well-to-do, the social elites, the rich, etc. But what and who this popolo is is very 
much, as discourse-theoretical analysis has it, a product of discursive operations. What 
discursively defines a popolo (the dependent variable of the analysis) is the outcome 
not only of varying vertical axes, but also, given the popolo’s particularity, of an inside-
outside axis. Classical Marxism had the analytical advantage of providing a clear funda-
tional anchor in the relations of production and the social trasnformations provoked by 
capitalism. “The people”, however, is not a class, and it may not even be a “class alli-
ance” (to use that older language).  It is a political operation, as discourse-theoretical 
analysis has it, but it is a political operation not done “in the void”, on “blank slates”, 
having a marked and generally emphasized social differentiation component. In that 
sense, the moralist component of “purity” and “corruption” of the Muddian approach 
not only is incorrect cross-regionally (Ostiguy 2017), but misses the main boat. Of 
greater interest is who are the people and who are the people’s antagonists (particu-
larly along the lines of Figure 1). The answer to that question provides furthermore the 
answer to differentiate left from right populism (Ostiguy and Casullo, 2017). 
Disciplinarily, the analysis here lays at the crosspoint of discourse and political soci-
ology. The cultural component of populism is not something political scientists should 
be indifferent to or find superficial but has deep roots in the sociology of distinction of 
Bourdieu, in cleavage theory, and, in aggiornado way, in “class” analysis of the Gram-
scian type and in Weberian types of authority. Most importantly, it is a (non-causal) 
understanding of populism that unproblematically travels cross-regionally and is there-
fore not limited to Europe and its world, or to the Americas.  
Putting attention as it does to the valuation of the culturally popular, the unrefined, 
le plouc, flaite and cholo –all terms, obviously, “from here”—and of personalization as 
a mode of authority that makes alternative sense, this understanding of populism takes 
into account questions of “pride”, “dignity”, lack of recognition, “deservingness”, and 
 
27 It would be a logical mistake, as a rebuttal, to affirm that “all parties with a ‘popular´electorate [would 
then be] populist” (De Cleen 2019:23). Communist parties with a strong component of miners and factory 
workers are not, simply for the fact of this electorate, populist. However, to have a sociological “pleb” 
component appears to be yet another necessary, though not sufficient, component of populism. Were so-
ciology entirely absent and all just contingent, we would be equally likely to have a populist movement of 
rich landowners and bankers as that of manual laborers. 
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many other key emotions very much present in the (dynamic) evolution of public social 
life.  
The approach is therefore not “culturalist”, but sociocultural and, at its core, rela-
tional. What leads to the emergence of populism in politics is left for other analyses, 
and can be quite context- or region- specific. Certainly, the decline of mass parties, par-
ticularly in Europe, has given great emphasis to the rise of more personalist figures of 
identification, particularly on the low. In Latin America however, the hyper-
personalization of politics under classic populism and mass party creation   went hand 
in hand.  
Ending as we started with the category of populism, most publications defining pop-
ulism have hitherto taken for granted that populism is a nominal category. That is, a 
“referent” (a politician, a statement, a party, a regime) is either populist or it is not. 
Even if we could all agree on a common definition of populism, it still remains unclear 
why a nominal category would be the most useful kind. We do need nominal catego-
ries to semantically know what we are talking about, when using a word in a sentence. 
When it comes to comparing observations (including about discourses) or even more 
so, to measurement, an advantage of understanding populism as a function of the use 
and degree of the “low” in politics is that it allows ordinal categories.28 To put it differ-
ently, it permits us to locate our objects spatially, on a scale. We routinely do the same 
with left and right. 
Ordinality is particularly useful both for politics and political analyses. Whether it is 
for high and low, populism and anti-populism, or left and right, it is often indispensable 
to be able to refer to a “left-of-center” or an “extreme left”; or to the “extreme right” 
and the role of the “center.” There also exist “outflanking on the low”; high-low politi-
cal polarizations; or high-low party convergences in choosing a candidate. The panora-
ma becomes particularly rich if the two orthogonal ordinalities are combined. This bi-
dimensional space, to be sure, is only productive and relevant in certain countries and 
at certain times, though its utility would seem to be spreading. But is Matteo Salvini 
more right or more low? Is the French Socialist Party more high or more left? Answers 
to those questions are not only academic, but have sociological entailments, as seen 
when observing the resulting social composition and magnitude of the vote.   
 
 
 
28 Certainly, scholars in the ideational tradition already do that, routinely. See Jagers and Walgrave (2007) 
for Belgium, Hawkins (2010) for Venezuela, and Hawkins and Rovira (2017) for Latin America. Any quanti-
tative textual coding, either of the sort pioneered by Hawkins (2010) or the standard content analysis, is 
bound to provide an ordinal, and even interval, measure of “populist-ness.” 
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